Under Revision
The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality
with Zihao Li (Last update: July 2025) Presented @ EC' 24, R&R @ Review of Economic Studies
In a dynamic principal-agent project selection problem where transfers cannot be used and quality can be verified at a (sufficiently low) cost, optimal verification dynamics are characterized by "decreasing skepticism."
Electric Vehicle Sharing: Crowding Adoption Out or In?
with Ruozi Song (Last update: March 2025) R&R @ Journal of Public Economics
An Electric Vehicle (EV)-based ridesharing program in Los Angeles led to an increase in EV purchases, despite being a direct substitute to car ownership. We argue information externalities are responsible.
Working Papers
Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational Robustness
with Zihao Li and Xiaosheng Mu (Last update: September 2025) Presented @ SITE 2023, EC' 25
We propose an approach to study informationally robust dynamic pricing when the seller lacks commitment.
Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
with Yingkai Li (Last update: April 2025) Presented @ EC' 24
We characterize when a designer, seeking to induce an agent to acquire information over time and able to condition rewards on outcomes, should simply elicit a single report after acquiring information.
Selecting Competing Proposals
with Peiran Xiao (Draft coming soon!)
We study a mechanism design problem without transfers where conflict arises endogenously from competition between agents. Optimal mechanisms manage this conflict by combining upward distortions in project choice with selection handicaps that favor weaker agents.
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