We introduce a selection criterion on behavioral biases in environments with learning, and show that it need not select for a bias-free worldview in some common applications.
We study dynamic disclosure when an exogenous public signal may or may not reflect noise. This uncertainty creates an asymmetry in the market's interpretation of news; if equilibrium involves pre-emptive disclosure, prices may drop discontinuously as news improves
We present an algorithm which, by positing linear demand, allows the monopolist to learn the optimal price even if demand is non-linear.
We empirically study registries, focusing mostly (but not exclusively) on the AEA RCT Registry, and theoretically discuss issues related to incentives behind registration.
The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality
In a principal-agent relationship where a project to be implemented is sought, and where transfers cannot be used but quality can be verified at a (sufficiently low) cost, the optimal mechanism features "increasing trust." This combines a deadline at which point allocation occurs with probability 1, and verification probabilities that decline over time.
I demonstrate how to recover a decisionmaker's information structure from posterior beliefs over states, together with posterior beliefs that each signal could be observed. In the process, I make new observations on the geometric structure of information.
An Electric Vehicle (EV)-based ridesharing program in Los Angeles led to an increase in EV purchases, despite being a direct substitute to car ownership. We argue information explains it.