with Kevin He (Last update: May 2025) R&R @ AEJ: Micro

If it is beneficial to misperceive higher-order beliefs when learning elasticity from prices, it is harmful when not learning.

Results from this paper originally appeared in Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

with Eliot Abrams and John A. List (Last update: March 2025) Resubmitted @ The Economic Journal

We empirically study registries, focusing mostly (but not exclusively) on the AEA RCT Registry, and theoretically discuss issues related to incentives behind registration.

The Mathematica notebook which we used in our calibration exercise can be found here, while the Mathematica notebook that checks our monotonicity condition can be found here.

with Kevin He (Last update: September 2024) R&R @ Journal of Economic Theory

We introduce a selection criterion on behavioral biases in environments with learning.

Results from this paper originally appeared in Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

with Zihao Li (Last update: March 2024) Presented @ EC' 24, R&R @ Review of Economic Studies

In a dynamic principal-agent project selection problem where transfers cannot be used and quality can be verified at a (sufficiently low) cost, optimal verification dynamics are characterized by "increasing trust."

with Yingkai Li (Last update: April 2025) Presented @ EC' 24

We characterize when a designer, seeking to induce an agent to acquire information over time and able to condition rewards on outcomes, should simply elicit a single report after acquiring information.

with Ruozi Song (Last update: March 2025)

An Electric Vehicle (EV)-based ridesharing program in Los Angeles led to an increase in EV purchases, despite being a direct substitute to car ownership. We argue information externalities are responsible.

with Zihao Li and Xiaosheng Mu (Last update: June 2024) Presented @ SITE 2023

We propose an approach to study informationally robust dynamic pricing when the seller lacks commitment.