with Kevin He (Last update: June 2024)

If it is beneficial to misperceive higher-order beliefs when learning elasticity from prices, it is harmful when not learning.

Results from this paper originally appeared in Evolutionarily Stabale (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

with Duarte Gonçalves and Jack Willis (Last update: June 2024) Resubmitted @ Review of Economic Studies

We conduct an experiment on belief updating and document that subjects under-react to information when it is in the form of a retraction.

with Zihao Li and Xiaosheng Mu (Last update: June 2024) Presented @ SITE 2023

We propose an approach to study informationally robust dynamic pricing when the seller lacks commitment.

with Kevin He (Last update: May 2024) 

We introduce a selection criterion on behavioral biases in environments with learning.

Results from this paper originally appeared in Evolutionarily Stabale (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

with Ruozi Song (Last update: April 2024)

An Electric Vehicle (EV)-based ridesharing program in Los Angeles led to an increase in EV purchases, despite being a direct substitute to car ownership. We argue information externalities are responsible.

with Zihao Li (Last update: March 2024) Presented @ EC' 24

In a dynamic principal-agent project selection problem where transfers cannot be used and quality can be verified at a (sufficiently low) cost, optimal verification dynamics are characterized by "increasing trust."

with Eliot Abrams and John A. List (Last update: January 2024) Rej&R @ The Economic Journal

We empirically study registries, focusing mostly (but not exclusively) on the AEA RCT Registry, and theoretically discuss issues related to incentives behind registration.

The Mathematica notebook which we used in our calibration exercise can be found here, while the Mathematica notebook that checks our monotonicity condition can be found here.

with Yingkai Li (Last update: November 2023) Presented @ EC' 24 

We characterize when a principal, seeking to induce an agent to acquire information over time and able to condition rewards on outcomes, should simply elicit a single report after acquiring information.

with Beatrice Michaeli and Elyashiv Wiedman (Last update: August 2023) Presented @ EC' 24, R&R @ Journal of Accounting and Economics 

We study dynamic disclosure when an exogenous public signal may or may not reflect noise. This uncertainty creates an asymmetry in the market's interpretation of news; if equilibrium involves pre-emptive disclosure, prices may drop discontinuously as news improves

with In-Koo Cho (Last Update: July 2023) R&R @ Journal of Economic Theory

We present an algorithm which, by positing linear demand, allows the monopolist to learn the optimal price even if demand is non-linear.